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I. Introduction
The global economy is currently facing a crisis which most economists 
recognize as the most damaging economic crisis since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. This crisis is different from recent global financial crises not only 
in its magnitude, but in its origin. The epicenter of this crisis was not in the 
developing or emerging economies, but the United States, home of the worlds 
most sophisticated and developed financial system. 
The crisis first hit other wealthy, developed economies: Europe and Japan. 
But this crisis has sent shock wages around the world, including what the 
investment world sometimes calls “Asia ex-Japan”, the emerging economies in 
Asia. Although, as we demonstrate below, the direct impact of the US subprime 
crisis on Asia’s financial institutions was relatively small, Asia’s financial 
markets are increasingly integrated with U.S. and other global capital markets, 
so the reverberations of the crisis were felt in both financial markets and real 
economy in Asia as well. 
In this study, we discuss the origins of current crisis and outline what we 
see as the main causes. We then discuss the effect of the crisis on financial 
markets and the real economy, especially in Asia. Finally, we turn to the global 
policy response, which has been dramatic. In contrast to the other studies in 
this volume, our focus is not on the role or policy prescriptions of multinational 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, but rather the policy 
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responses of sovereign nations affected by the crisis. However, like the other 
studies in this volume, we examine these policy responses through the lens of 
previous crises, highlighting how policy prescriptions have changed in the light 
of the unique features of this current crisis. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss the 
origin of the crisis in the advanced economies, the events that defined the crisis, 
and its main causes. Section III discusses the impacts of the current crisis in 
financial markets and the real economy, focusing on the impact in the emerging 
economies of Asia. Section IV catalogues the policy responses in Asia and 
the scope for further policy implementation, organizing the discussion around 
policies to strengthen financial institutions, monetary policy to provide liquidity 
and support financial markets and fiscal policy to stimulate demand. Section 
V summarizes our arguments, in particular a call for more coordination in the 
region as further policy measures become necessary.  
II. Origins of the Crisis
The current crisis started in the worlds largest, most innovative, and until, 
recently, most profitable financial institutions in the world: U.S. investment 
banks. Table 1 shows the main balance sheet data for the top investment banks 
by asset size in the last fiscal year. As is now well known, financial innovation 
and excess liquidity led the investment banks to become overleveraged. The 
U.S. banks all have leverage ratios of capital to assets of at least 30%, and in 
some cases as high as 110%. In retrospect, these are clearly dangerous levels 
and would not be allowed in standard commercial banks. As indicated in Table 
2, which gives the same balance sheet information for the top U.S. commercial 
banks, even many of the now-troubled commercial banks that have received 
government bailouts had leverage ratios of about 1/3 that of the investment 
banks. 
Strains on the investment banking model first cracked with the essential 
failure of Bear Stearns, which cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) US$30 billion to cover its losses in order to arrange an acquisition 
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by JP Morgan Chase on March 16, 2008. But the dam really broke about six 
months later, when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, originally government owned 
private mortgage companies, were bailed out with over US$5 trillion in debt on 
September 7, 2008. Just one week later, Merrill Lynch, the biggest investment 
bank in the world measured in terms of assets, was sold to Bank of America 
and effectively merged into a commercial bank. Perhaps the biggest shock to 
financial markets came the next day, when Lehman Brothers, also in the top 10 
investment banks worldwide, filed for bankruptcy protection. And one week 
after that, the two remaining U.S. investment banks(1), Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley, filed to become bank holding companies so that they could 
have access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window and other tools for 
providing liquidity. 
What went wrong in the investment banking model? The fundamental 
cause is widely recognized as inadequate supervision and regulation, especially 
of the U.S. “originate and distribute” banking model, but excess liquidity caused 
by loose monetary policy and the global savings imbalance was an important 
catalyst. We discuss both causes below. 
Regulation and Supervision
Financial globalization and innovation without adequate financial 
supervision and regulation at the national and global levels is perhaps the key 
cause of the current global financial crisis. One of most important cases is 
the lack of suitable supervision in the “originate and distribute” model of US 
lending. The originate and distribute model of lending, where the originator 
of a loan (the bank that originally makes the loan to an individual or business) 
sells it to various third parties, has become a popular vehicle for credit and 
liquidity management in recent years. Often associated with mortgages and 
other collateralized loans, under the originate and distribute model of lending, 
banks bundled up mortgages and sold them off to third parties, often investment 
Note that Citi and JP Morgan were already bank holding companies.(1)
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banks(2). Investment banks, the new trustees of the sold-off loans or mortgages, 
are much less regulated than traditional commercial banks since they are 
not allowed to accept federally insured deposits. As trustees, the investment 
banks would often securitize the loans, issuing asset (mortgage) backed stocks 
or “mortgage bonds”. Trading in these asset derivatives was often over the 
counter and so not subject to regulation by either commercial bank regulators or 
securities exchange regulators. Investors were happy because these asset backed 
securities paid higher yields than treasury bonds and other debt instruments 
and were theoretically low risk since the original loans were collateralized 
and the loans have been bundled into packages to reduce idiosyncratic default 
risk. The banks benefitted from the boost to capital and improved liquidity 
risk management they got by getting the heavier risk-weighted assets off 
their balance sheets in exchange for cash, or at least lower risk-weighted debt 
instruments. The investment banks made high returns off very little capital. 
The benefits of these types of financial innovations and the expertise of the 
U.S. investment banks in sophisticated financial instruments was admired and 
emulated elsewhere, but now the costs of this lending model have been sharply 
demonstrated. As banking shifted from traditional loan contracts to the originate-
and-distribute model, the originating banks’ fundamental role as financial 
intermediaries, to screen and monitor borrowers to minimize the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, began to break down. By separating the 
originator of a loan from the bearer of its ultimate default-risk, the originate 
and distribute model removed incentives to avoid excessively risky loans. In 
addition, by distancing the borrowers from the ultimate bearer of default risk, the 
originate and distribute model weakened the incentive for the banks to monitor 
borrowers or to intervene when problems became apparent. These incentive 
problems are usually more severe the less capitalized (more leveraged) the bank, 
and the less the bank needs to rely on demand deposits. Although bundling the 
With the repeal of the 1933 Glass Steagall Act separating investment and commercial banks 
(the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), these investment banks may have been under the same 
umbrella bank holding company as the originating commercial bank.
(2)
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loans reduced idiosyncratic risk, it didn’t alter systemic risk, so when the sub-
prime mortgage market went into systemic failure, the model collapsed. 
Since few investors really understood the sophisticated financial 
instruments they were trading, and which were backed by the problematic 
subprime loans, it took just a small amount of delinquent loans(3) to trigger a 
massive global crisis. 
Excess Liquidity
Exacerbating the issue of inadequate regulation and supervision we describe 
above were the loose credit conditions globally. Some pundits have termed this 
crisis the “Greenspan Crisis”, not only because of the former Federal Reserve 
Board chair’s opposition to regulating derivatives markets, but also because they 
lay blame on excessively loose US monetary policy under Greenspan’s tenure. 
Indeed, both quantity and price indicators point to excess liquidity conditions in 
the major economies. Figure 1 shows the ratio of M2 to GDP for the U.S., Euro 
Area and Japan on a steadily upward trend since 1999. At the same time, short-
term interest rates have been at historically low levels, most notably in Japan, 
where the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) was in place since the fourth quarter 
of 1995, but also the US and Euro Area, where rates began to fall in the late 
2000.  
Others, also recognizing the role of excessively liquid credit markets, put 
the blame not on monetary policy, but the global savings imbalance, the causes 
of which are less obvious. The U.S. current account deficit and its twin financial 
account surplus are well known empirical facts. Some economists argue that the 
widening U.S. current account deficit also partly reflects monetary policy (Bems, 
Dedola and Smets, 2007), but the traditional argument has been that aggregate 
saving, both private (American consumers) and government (the huge U.S. 
Schoenbaum (2009) points out subprime loans represent only 12 percent of outstanding home 
mortgage loans in the U.S. and that only 20 percent of these are delinquent, yet that was 
sufficient to trigger a crisis because “no one really knew the extent to which subprime loans 
were implicated in particular bundles of securitizations or derivatives”. 
(3)
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government deficit), in the U.S. has been too low, driving huge current account 
deficits. Using the same basic framework, current Federal Reserve chair Ben 
Bernanke turned that thinking on its head with his argument that the causality runs 
the other way around: the great investment options in the United States serve 
as a magnet for the excess savings in the rest of the world, particularly Asia. It 
is not low U.S. savings, but the “Global Savings Glut” (Bernanke, 2005) in the 
rest of the world that drives the US financial account into surplus, and hence its 
current account into deficit.  
III. Impacts of the Crisis in Asia 
This combination of inadequate regulation and supervision with excess 
liquidity globally set the stage for the series of events described above: the 
arranged merger of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, the government bailout 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and finally the failure of Lehman Brothers. It 
was Lehman’s collapse that most shocked financial markets: when the news hit 
toward the end of September 2008, the LIBOR(4) rate spiked to a historic high of 
6.8% as banks, wondering who would be the next victim, grew wary of lending 
to each other. In the autumn of 2008, as policy makers debated on the best 
response and struggled to gain public or congressional support for their proposed 
measures, the world continued to witness a series of historic events in financial 
markets. The Dow Jones average posted its worst annual decline since the Great 
Depression, the London Stock Exchange hit its lowest level in more than 25 
years, and the Nikkei fell by nearly 50% to the lowest level in 26 years, making 
2008 the worst on record. In the fourth quarter of 2008 the crisis officially hit 
the “real” economy: the United States, Japan and the Euro Area all declared 
their economies had officially entered recession. The advanced economies 
experienced an unprecedented 71/2 percent decline in the fourth quarter of 2008.
The LIBOR, or London InterBank Offered Rate is the rate that banks charge each other for 
loans ranging between one month to one year. The rate is published by the British Bankers 
Association based on a panel of banks representing countries in each currency and is used as a 
benchmark for bank rates all over the world. 
(4)
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Financial Institutions
Asia’s financial institutions had relatively little direct exposure to U.S. 
subprime-related securitized products such as mortgage backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations. Even Japanese banks, which had the largest 
exposure, were still solid enough to come to the rescue of some of the West’s 
failed financial institutions in the critical period in the fall of 2008. At the height 
of the crisis in the fall of 2008, write downs and other credit losses reported by 
Asian financial institutions was only about 3% of the estimated $577 billion 
in losses of the worlds 100 largest banks and securities firms. This compares 
favorably with that of the U.S. (55%) and Europe (40%). More significant than 
Asia’s overall burden in the crisis is how those losses compare to the capital and 
asset position of Asia’s financial institutions. Our estimates in Table 3 indicate 
that subprime losses as a percentage of bank capital in Asia are about half that of 
the United States, and for the “plus 3” countries of Japan, Korea and China, the 
ratio is below 3% (5).  
Capital Markets
Equity markets in Asia are a different story. Capital market liberalization in 
emerging economies in Asia and the rest of the world means that equity markets 
in emerging economies are increasingly integrated with the U.S.(6) The hits to U.S. 
equity markets in the aftermath of the crisis severely affected Asia. Although 
losses in the Dow perhaps made bigger headlines, Figure 2 below shows that the 
collapse in Asia’s emerging markets was even more severe. Figure 3 illustrates 
that currencies in the region, with the exception of the Japanese yen, which 
appreciated as carry trades were unwound, and Chinese renminbi, which like 
Although direct losses from subprime loans are relatively small, Asian economies hold an 
enormous amount of U.S. financial assets, the value of which will likely be affected in the 
aftermath of the crisis. In addition, bank liquidity in the region would be damaged were foreign 
liabilities, which have risen sharply in the early 2000s, were to be called home. 
Kawai, Lamberte and Yang (2009) show evidence of increasing and high correlations between 
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other currencies pegged to the dollar has appreciated slightly in real effective 
terms, have depreciated. This is despite use of international reserves for support. 
The Real Economy
Despite negative impacts to Asia’s financial sector, as the crisis unfolded 
the world looked to the region a source of growth since direct losses to financial 
institutions were relatively small, as explained above. This, combined with solid 
macroeconomic fundamentals and healthy bank balance sheets was expected to 
cushion Asia from the some of damage seen elsewhere.  
But trade, the engine of Asia’s phenomenal development, collapsed 
in late 2008 as credit – in particular sources of trade credit – dried up and 
global demand dwindled. Thus, the toll of the crisis on Asia’s real economy 
has been heavier than first expected. Trade in consumer durable goods such 
as automobiles and electronics, the foundation of much of Asia’s vertically 
integrated trade structure, was the most severely affected by the drop off in 
global demand. 
The most developed economies in the region have suffered the most. 
Japan’s economy contracted 12% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the newly 
industrialized economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan showed 
similarly high rates of decline: between 10-25%. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies have also been hurt by the drop off in global 
demand, but the composition of their exports is less concentrated in the sectors 
most affected by the global downturn. The ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam) have not been as severely hit as the advanced 
countries in Asia, but they have seen annual growth fall from 6.3% in 2007 to 
just under 5% in 2008 and the IMF, 2009 expects growth to drop off sharply to 
0% in 2009. China and India have also certainly been affected by the contraction 
in global trade, but their economies have continued to grow – albeit at more 
modest rates of 9.0 and 7.3 percent annually – because trade is a smaller share 
of their economies and they have had more room for expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy measures. 
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IV. Policy Response
Given the unique origins and causes of this global crisis, the policy 
response has been markedly different from that of previous crises the world has 
witnessed. Throughout Asia, the challenge is to reduce economic reliance on 
exports and rebalance the source of growth toward a more sustainable reliance 
on domestic consumption while cushioning the economy from the effects 
of the crisis. Globally, the response can be categorized as a three-pronged 
approach: restoring the health of the financial sector, boosting liquidity through 
expansionary monetary policy and stimulating aggregate demand through 
fiscal policy. Restoring the health of the financial sector has in some cases 
been politically controversial, but for the most part accepted as economically 
necessary. But some policy recommendations for monetary or fiscal policy 
have been sharp departures from previous recommendations from economic 
advisors. Unlike the Asian crisis of 1997, when interest rates were hiked to 
try and prop up fixed exchange rates, this time the policy response has largely 
been expansionary monetary policy through low policy interest rates and other 
measures to provide liquidity. In stark contrast to some of the debt crises that 
hit Latin American economies in the 1980s, the call this time has been for 
expansionary fiscal policy, although economists recognize the need for caution 
in countries with heavy public debt burdens.  
Financial Sector
Restoring the health of the financial sector was the first priority for most 
policy makers. To help struggling banks, governments have announced plans 
to purchase bad assets, helped negotiate mergers in the industry, increase and 
expand existing deposit insurance programs and boost capital ratios. 
The policy initiatives in the U.S., where the financial institutions have been 
the most damaged, has been the most aggressive and innovative. The largest 
and most hotly debated has been U.S.’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
which allocates US$700 billion toward the purchase of bad loans on bank 
books. A substantial chunk of that has also been spent on capital injections into 
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top banks and more are expected: the results of the much-awaited stress test on 
America’s 19 largest banks were revealed last week and the results suggest ten 
of the group still need to pump up the common-equity component. As pointed 
out in Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2008, there is much to be learned from the 
experience of Japan in the 1990s on asset management companies and capital 
injections, but we leave that analysis for future research.    
In Asia as well, there have been plans to boost bank capital announced in 
India and Japan. Hong Kong and Korea also stand ready to step in if necessary. 
But since direct subprime loan losses by banks in Asia have so far been limited, 
policies to strengthen financial institutions in Asia have focused less on shoring 
up weak banks and more on preventing bank runs and ensuring that financial 
institutions are able to continue to provide credit to prevent a “credit crunch” 
from cutting off investment and hampering economic growth. 
To prevent potential bank runs, policies have mostly focused on extending 
deposit guarantees (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) and raising 
deposit insurance limits (Indonesia and the Philippines). To reduce the risk of a 
credit crunch, China and Korea have announced credit support for the corporate 
sector: China, by lifting credit controls, and Korea through the introduction of 
a US$30 billion package to guarantee short-term foreign bank loans. Finally, 
to keep declines in asset values such as equity values from crippling the banks, 
countries such as Japan, the Philippines and Singapore have eased “mark-to-
market” accounting rules requiring them to price assets on their books at current 
market value. 
So far, given the limited damage to bank balance sheets in the region, these 
steps may have been enough. But the full extent of this crisis and its impacts 
globally may still be unfolding, so policy makers need to ensure tools for public 
capital injections will be available if necessary.
Monetary Policy
In the first few months of the global financial crisis, most central banks in 
the region adopted tighter monetary policy to counteract inflation. However, as 
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shown in Table 4, by late 2008 as crisis gained momentum, most countries have 
loosened monetary policy to ease liquidity conditions and to assuage fears of 
deflation in the region. 
Except for a few countries in South Asia, most notably Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, where inflation continues to be a concern, nearly all central banks in 
the region have cut monetary policy interest rates (or their equivalent). Many 
countries (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam) have combined cuts 
in policy rates with lower reserve requirements.  Reserve requirements are the 
amount of cash commercial banks must keep on deposit at the central bank as a 
provision against deposit withdrawals. In many countries, these deposits do not 
earn any interest for the banks so they are essentially lost income, or a tax on the 
banking sector. Lowering those requirements is one way to increase liquidity in 
the financial sector: without those funds on reserve, banks can use them in their 
core role as financial intermediaries by lending them out to business and other 
investors. Even in South Asia, where containing inflation is still on the minds 
of monetary policy board members, lower policy rates has been combined with 
lowered reserve requirements to provide liquidity. 
Countries in the region still under some form of capital controls or financial 
repression have eased regulations: China has loosened credit ceilings and India 
has eased controls on capital inflows. 
Looking forward, there may still be room for further monetary policy easing 
in countries such as China, Korea, Malaysia or especially India, where real rates 
(the nominal rate minus the rate of inflation) remain relatively high. But Japan, 
in particular, has cut policy rates to virtually zero, so the scope for conventional 
monetary policy is limited. Policy makers in Japan have also increased liquidity 
provisions, broadened the range of eligible collateral and started purchasing 
commercial paper and bonds to ease corporate funding pressures. Other central 
banks in the region have also implemented innovative policy responses: 
Cambodia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have 
injected liquidity into strained money markets, India has introduced foreign 
exchange swaps for banks and Korea has arranged for exchange swaps with the 
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U.S., Japan and China. 
Fiscal Policy
Most economies in Asia have simultaneously implemented expansionary 
fiscal policy to support domestic aggregate demand. The biggest stimulus 
packages have been announced by the “plus three” economies: China, Japan and 
Korea. China’s announcement of a RMB 4 trillion (US$586 billion) stimulus 
package over two-years grabbed headlines, although is has since become 
apparent that the national government will provide less than half that figure, 
leaving local governments and state owned banks and enterprises to come up 
with the balance. Japan announced a huge stimulus package including a planned 
2,000 billion yen (US$21.3 billion) handout to citizens: 12,000 yen per adult and 
20,000 for children and pensioners. The Korean government has also announced 
that its budget for 2009 will include an additional US$11 billion stimulus 
package. 
These fiscal stimulus packages in particular are a step toward the long-
called for “rebalancing” of Asian economies. Many economists estimate there 
is still room for additional fiscal stimulus in the region since with very few 
exceptions the economies in Asia have small budget deficits, or, in some cases, 
even budget surpluses. But in a few countries with high levels of public debt 
such as India, the Philippines, and especially Japan, where net debt is projected 
to exceed 100% of GDP in 2009, need to temper any further stimulus with a 
concrete economic plan to secure fiscal sustainability. 
V. Conclusions
Although we agree with the majority of economists who feel the current 
crisis will stop short of becoming a technical “depression” and remain an 
economic “recession”, it remains an historic event because of the depth and 
breadth of the economic damage.  Although Asia has not had direct damage to 
its banking sector on the scale of that seen in the U.S. or Europe, the resulting 
fall off in global demand has crippled trade and therefore economic growth in 
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the export-driven economies of the region. 
This crisis has changed the face of global banking: banking around 
the world has become more concentrated as governments have encouraged 
mergers of weak or illiquid institutions with healthier ones, and the American 
model of investment banking has disappeared as one by one all of the top U.S. 
investment banks have either filed for bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers), merged 
into commercial banks (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) or converted to bank 
holding companies in order to become eligible for discount window loans and 
other government programs (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley(7)). The U.S. 
has become the last to resign itself to a more German (or, since the “Big Bang”, 
Japanese) universal banking model in which bank holding companies serve 
as umbrellas for commercial banks, securities companies and even insurance 
companies.
The crisis has also reversed many international financial policy 
prescriptions. With the U.S. at its epicenter, the crisis has led to calls for tighter 
supervision of even sophisticated financial markets by global watchdogs such as 
the International Monetary Fund. Although still not on a scale to deal with the 
size of the problem in the United States, the IMF has seen its resources triple 
from $250 billion to $750 billion. In Asia, national policy prescriptions have 
taken a u-turn from previous crises. Countries now struggle to delicately balance 
the need to stabilize falling currencies, which would normally call for higher 
interest rates, with frozen asset markets, which call for loose monetary policy to 
restore liquidity. Governments that were once advised or cajoled into reducing 
the role of the government and various spending programs are now faced with 
the difficult task of implementing fiscal stimulus programs while also ensuring 
long-term fiscal sustainability. 
On the whole, the policy responses in Asia have been swift and appropriate. 
The Asian Development Bank forecasts a V-shaped recovery in 2010 (Asian 
The remaining two top U.S. investment banks, Citi and JP Morgan, were already under the 
umbrella of a bank holding company.
(7)
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Development Bank, 2009). But as the reverberations of this crisis continue to 
be felt in the rest of the world,  more may be needed. Most countries still have 
room to maneuver, but Japan in particular faces a difficult set of conditions. 
Like many other countries in the region, we question whether Japan would be 
prepared in the event of a sudden need for capital boosts in the banking sector. 
Many countries in Asia still have room to loosen monetary policy, but Japan is 
again facing the riddle of trying to loosen monetary policy under zero interest 
rates. And while most of the region has a healthy national balance sheet, Japan 
already has a deficit of about 10% of GDP and public debt is approaching over 
100% of GDP, limiting the scope for future fiscal policy measures. 
In ex-Japan Asia there is more room for further policy measures. Looking 
forward, we encourage countries to recognize that the rising degree of economic 
interdependence among Asian economies requires a much more coordinated 
policy response. Working through institutions such as the ASEAN+3 Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue process, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the 
Asian Bond Markets Initiative, countries in the region can avoid inefficient 
outcomes that may result from continued fragmentation of policy responses(8). 
Trade negotiations toward an Asian free-trade area, or, even more critically, 
the failed Doha round, are crucial in stemming the rise of protectionism seen 
in the aftermath of this crisis. But while supporting trade initiatives, Asian 
economies also need to work toward rebalancing their economies away from 
US and European demand to regional or even domestic markets. With a more 
coordinated response, Asia may be able to serve as the source of global growth 
the world hoped for in the fall of 2008. 
Kawai, Lamberte and Yang (2009) discuss some of these outcomes, in particular the possible 
flight of deposits in response to uncoordinated bank deposit guarantee programs (as seen in 
Europe) or spillovers of fiscal policy stimulus with may reduce incentives for countries to 
implement their own programs. 
(8)
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Figure 1: Evidence of Excess Global Liquidity
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
Table 3: Estimated Subprime Losses in U.S., Europe, Japan and Emerging 
Asia 
Notes:
Bank losses and writedowns are as of Sep. 2008
Japan - Mizuho Financial Group, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Sumitomo Financial Group and 
Nomura Holdings
Korea - Woori Bank
China - Bank of China, Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank
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Malaysia - 0.3 % of capital base of banks
Singapore - DBS Bank
USA - 19 banks
Europe - 30 banks
Source: Bloomberg; various news media; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Figure 2: Equity Markets in the U.S., Asia, other Emerging Markets 
Source: Bloomberg
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Figure 3:  Foreign Exchange Movements in Asia
 
 Table 4. Asian Economies’ Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis 
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The global economy is currently facing a crisis which most economists 
recognize as the most damaging economic crisis since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. This crisis is different from recent global financial crises not only in 
its magnitude, but in its origin. Therefore this crisis requires a new set of policy 
prescriptions. In this study, we discuss the origins of current global financial 
crisis and outline what we see as the main causes. We then discuss the effect of 
the crisis on financial markets and the real economy, especially in Asia. Finally, 
we turn to the global policy response, which has been dramatic. In contrast to the 
other studies in this volume, our focus is not on the role or policy prescriptions 
of multinational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, but 
rather the policy responses of sovereign nations affected by the crisis. However, 
like the other studies in this volume, we examine these policy responses through 
the lens of previous crises, highlighting how policy prescriptions have changed 
in the light of the unique features of this current crisis. Although on the whole 
we find policy responses in the region to have been appropriate, we conclude 
with a call for more coordination looking forward, particularly in stemming 
protectionist pressures that have risen up in the aftermath of this crisis.
